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CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT DIALOGUE
OVERVIEW
ETHAN A. MILLS

My book, Three Pillars of Skepticism in Classical India: Nāgārjuna, Jayarāśi, and
Śrī Harṣa, grew out of my work in graduate school, which in turn grew out of my
long-time interests in philosophical skepticism. In the preface I explain that as a child
I often felt that people around me didn’t really know what they were talking about.
Moving to the first year of my PhD program at the University of New Mexico, I felt
that there was something wrong with me: whereas everyone around me seemed to
have strong opinions about various philosophical matters, I often found myself
without any such opinions. Yet I found intellectual kinship in the works of Jayarāśi,
Sextus Empiricus, and Nāgārjuna (Śrī Harṣa would come later). I made friends with
these ancient philosophers and these strange friendships have influenced my life –
whether for good or for ill it’s hard to say.
In the introduction, I state the thesis of the book: the classical Indian philosophical
tradition contains a tradition of skepticism about philosophy represented most clearly
by three figures: Nāgārjuna (c. 150-200 CE), Jayarāśi (c. 770-830 CE), and Śrī Harṣa
(c. 1125-1180 CE); understanding this tradition ought to be an important part of our
metaphilosophical reflections on the purposes and limits of philosophy today. Unlike
varieties of epistemological skepticism familiar to philosophers today, which consist
of doubts about knowledge in particular domains (the external world, induction, etc.),
skepticism about philosophy is found most clearly in the Western tradition in
Hellenistic Pyrrhonian skepticism, which consists of a therapy for those afflicted by
the philosophical quest for dogmatic beliefs. My book is situated within a larger
project that I call expanding the history of philosophy. Just as the history of Western
philosophy informs and illuminates contemporary philosophy, so can expanding the
history of philosophy to include classical India and other traditions serve to enhance
philosophical pursuits today.
Chapter one serves as the prehistory of the three major figures discussed later.
The thesis of chapter one is that the seeds of skepticism about philosophy can be
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found in the earliest strata of the Indian philosophical tradition: in the Ṛg Veda, in
some Upaniṣads, and in some early Buddhist texts. This demonstrates that the type of
skepticism that received sophisticated development in the classical tradition was a
development of ideas found hundreds of years earlier. Nāgārjuna developed early
Buddhist quietism, Jayarāśi developed the materialist and Sañjayan strains, and Śrī
Harṣa developed Upaniṣadic mystical skepticism. This represents an alternative
historiography of Indian philosophy: traditions can be distinguished by philosophical
methods and psychological goals. This complicates but does not entirely replace the
traditional school model based on explicitly articulated beliefs and religious praxis. I
uncover a history of skepticism about philosophy in classical India by drawing
together figures that are typically considered to be members of competing schools.
Chapters two and three cover Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Madhyamaka school
of Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy. The thesis of chapter two is that Nāgārjuna is
best interpreted as a skeptic about philosophy and as the first of the three pillars of the
classical Indian tradition of skepticism about philosophy (I borrow the image of the
three pillars from Eli Franco). I show how my interpretation incorporates the best of
the more plausible existing interpretations (mysticism, anti-realism, and
epistemological skepticism), but without the weaknesses of these interpretations.
Nāgārjuna’s procedure operates in two phases: in phase one he argues in favor of a
thesis of emptiness, but in phase two he demonstrates that emptiness purges
Mādhyamikas of any view, thesis, or theory whatsoever, even views about emptiness
itself. Nāgārjuna’s skepticism fits with and bolsters his Buddhist credentials as a
legitimate development of early Buddhist quietism, and my skeptical interpretation
also has precedents within the Buddhist tradition in India, China, and Tibet.
The thesis of chapter three is that skepticism about philosophy can make sense of
Nāgārjuna’s arguments about epistemology and metaphysics. After a tour of
Nāgārjuna’s arguments about epistemology in the Vigrahavyāvartanī, I make a case
study of Nāgārjuna’s famous arguments on causal theories in Mūlamadhyamikakārikā
chapter one, which shows that skepticism about philosophy makes for a coherent
interpretation of this chapter and its place in the text. I end with reflections on how
Nāgārjuna combined two main trends of early Buddhist philosophy: analysis-insight
and quietism.
Chapters four and five cover Jayarāśi, who I argue is both a skeptic and a member
of the irreligious Cārvāka school. The thesis of chapter three is that Jayarāśi is best
interpreted as a skeptic about philosophy and as the second of the three pillars. I begin
by showing that the study of Cārvāka in general and Jayarāśi in particular can
contribute to a richer understanding of the diversity of Indian thought. Next I present
the basic thrust of Jayarāśi’s Tattvopaplavasiṃha (Lion of the Destruction of
Principles): the destruction of all philosophical principles, especially in epistemology.
I find it helpful to compare Jayarāśi’s outlook to contextualism in contemporary
epistemology: in the context of epistemology, epistemology self-destructs; in the
context of everyday life, there is no need for epistemology. Lastly, I consider how
Jayarāśi can be seen as a Cārvāka. The delightful destruction of epistemology clears
the ground for a form of life free from the burdens of philosophy and religion. Thus,
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we have a uniquely irreligious strand within the classical Indian tradition of
skepticism about philosophy.
Chapter five applies the general interpretive framework of the previous chapter to
Jayarāśi’s arguments against the epistemological theories of the Buddhist
philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti. I conceptualize Jayarāśi’s critique in terms of
what contemporary epistemologist Michael Williams calls “epistemological realism,”
or the idea that there are such things as structures of human knowledge about which
epistemologists can theorize. I give a detailed analysis of two of Jayarāśi’s arguments:
the Non-Establishment of Difference Argument, which tries to show that the
Buddhists cannot maintain a difference between perception and inference, and the
Impossibility of Considering Duality Argument, which shows that, if the Buddhist
theory that there are two mutually incompatible means of knowledge were true, one
could never establish that this theory is true. I end with reflections on how these
arguments fit within Jayarāśi’s larger project of skepticism about philosophy.
Chapters six and seven cover Śrī Harṣa, who is usually considered to be part of
the Brahmanical Advaita Vedānta school. The thesis of chapter six is that Śrī Harṣa
should, like Nāgārjuna and Jayarāśi, be read as a skeptic about philosophy and as the
third pillar. After a treatment of his philosophical context, especially post-Śaṅkara
Advaita Vedānta and the realism of the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools, I then discuss
the major contemporary interpretations of Śrī Harṣa from scholars such as Granoff,
Phillips, and Ram-Prasad, showing the strengths and weaknesses of each
interpretation. The point of Śrī Harṣa’s negative dialectic is to eliminate realism and
to present the possibility of experience of non-dual brahman, but that unlike other
contemporary scholars, I see this as a kind of skepticism about philosophy and part of
the tradition that I have been exploring. In particular, Śrī Harṣa presents an incredibly
sophisticated development of Upaniṣadic mystical skepticism.
The thesis of chapter seven is that applying the interpretation developed in the
previous chapter to some of Śrī Harṣa’s specific arguments in the
Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya makes good sense of both these specific arguments and of
Śrī Harṣa’s overall purpose. I begin with Śrī Harṣa’s discussion of the role of the
means of knowledge in a philosophical debate; he argues, contrary to his realist
opponents, that participation in philosophical debate does not commit one to
accepting the validity of the means of knowledge. I then look at Śrī Harṣa’s
devastating critique of the coherence of realist notions of existence (sattā and tattva).
All of this not only demonstrates that Śrī Harṣa is skeptical about philosophy, but
shows that he can remain non-dogmatically open to the possibility that there could be
veridical non-dual experience without thereby providing any philosophical arguments
in favor of such a view.
Having completed the main argument of the book, in the conclusion I consider
what this type of skepticism might teach us today. Are the three pillars in some sense
right? Is there any good that comes out of philosophical inquiry? Are recent
philosophy naysayers like Stephen Hawking and Marco Rubio right that philosophy
is a useless enterprise? I begin my answer by suggesting that skepticism about
philosophy is a cross-cultural phenomenon with examples of Pyrrhonians in the West
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and perhaps Zhuangzi in China and al-Ghazali in Islamic philosophy. The historical
persistence of skepticism about philosophy raises deep questions about the limits of
human capacities for philosophical inquiry as explored in recent work such as Susan
Blackmore on memes, Noam Chomsky on mysterianism, and Graham Priest on the
limits of thought.
Yet I argue in favor a mitigated form of skepticism about philosophy: while I
agree with the three pillars that philosophy is unlikely to yield non-controversial
answers anytime soon (as demonstrated via a millennia-long pessimistic induction), I
argue that philosophy is valuable for at least three reasons. 1. It can be fun. 2. It
develops cognitive capacities such as intellectual imagination, critical thinking skills,
and intellectual empathy. 3. It can lessen dogmatism. I end with reflections on the
importance of the history of philosophy and especially the necessity of expanding our
histories to include multiple traditions. If we claim that the history of philosophy
enriches our present-day understandings of ourselves and our interrogations of what it
means to be human, then it is myopic madness to limit ourselves to the history of one
geographical tradition.
Part of what I’m trying to do with this book is to offer interpretations that can
make sense of these often puzzling texts, but I also want to challenge prevailing ideas
about the study of the classical Indian tradition as well as philosophy more generally.
This book may fail to convince many of its readers. But that’s okay. It’s enough, I
think, to have encouraged people to reconsider assumptions about the three pillars,
classical Indian philosophy, and philosophy more generally. Given the various crises
assailing our discipline both within and without, I suspect some rethinking is on order.
If my book serves to provoke a few thoughts and encourage some rethinking of
assumptions, then I will consider it a success.
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